Vetsikas, I. A. and Jennings, N. R. (2008) Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions. In: 23rd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), July 13-17, 2008, Chicago, USA. pp. 182-189.
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Abstract
When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies
in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that
go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditional
auction theory. Oftentimes, the agents have budget
constraints and the auctions have a reserve price, both of
which restrict the bids the agents can place. In addition, their
attitude need not be risk-neutral and they may have uncertainty
about the value of the goods they are buying. Some of
these issues have been examined individually for single-unit
sealed-bid auctions. In this paper, we extend this analysis to
the multi-unit case, and also analyze the multi-unit sealed-bid
auctions in which a combination of these issues are present,
for unit-demand bidders. This analysis constitutes the main
contribution of this paper. We then demonstrate the usefulness
in practice of this analysis; we show in simulations that
taking into account all these issues allows the bidders to maximize
their utility. Furthermore, using this analysis allows a
seller to improve her revenue, i.e. by selecting the optimal
reserve price.
Introduction
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item | ||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Creator/Authors: |
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| Research Group: | Old ECS Groups > Intelligence, Agents, Multimedia Current ECS Groups > Agents, Interaction and Complexity | ||||
| Date: | 15 April 2008 | ||||
| Information about this record: | |||||
| Performance Indicator: | EZ~02~02~04 | ||||
| Citations: | ISI: 2, Google Scholar: 8 | ||||
| Downloads (2010): | 19 | ||||
| ID Code: | 15652 | ||||
| Last Modified: | 23 Sep 2011 10:36 | ||||
| Deposited On: | 29 Apr 2008 16:14 by Vetsikas, Ioannis | ||||
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