Vetsikas, I. A. and Jennings, N. R. (2008) Bidding Strategies for Realistic Multi-Unit Sealed-Bid Auctions. In: 23rd Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-08), July 13-17, 2008, Chicago, USA. pp. 182-189.
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Abstract
When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies
in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that
go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditional
auction theory. Oftentimes, the agents have budget
constraints and the auctions have a reserve price, both of
which restrict the bids the agents can place. In addition, their
attitude need not be risk-neutral and they may have uncertainty
about the value of the goods they are buying. Some of
these issues have been examined individually for single-unit
sealed-bid auctions. In this paper, we extend this analysis to
the multi-unit case, and also analyze the multi-unit sealed-bid
auctions in which a combination of these issues are present,
for unit-demand bidders. This analysis constitutes the main
contribution of this paper. We then demonstrate the usefulness
in practice of this analysis; we show in simulations that
taking into account all these issues allows the bidders to maximize
their utility. Furthermore, using this analysis allows a
seller to improve her revenue, i.e. by selecting the optimal
reserve price.
Introduction
| Creators: | Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Nicholas R. Jennings |
|---|---|
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item |
| Research Group: | Intelligence, Agents, Multimedia |
| Deposited On: | 29 Apr 2008 17:14 by Vetsikas, Ioannis |
| ID Code: | 15652 |
| Last Modified: | 18 Feb 2010 15:59 |
| Performance Indicator: | EZ~02~02~04 |
| Citations: | Google Scholar: 1 |
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